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Abstract: 
We examine the role one-time threats of expulsion and punishment have on voluntary contributions in a 
public goods game. This paper extends the work of Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2005), who find 
that the threat of expulsion in every period raises contributions to near Pareto Optimal levels. In our 
experiments, participants played in 15-round sessions where they were allowed to vote to remove other 
subjects only after round 5 and in one design also voted whether to punish the remaining subjects after 
round 10. We find that the additional threat of punishment not only increased the contributions of 
participants before the punishment vote, but also resulted in the expulsion of participants who had 
contributed more than in the no punishment treatment. Efficiency with expulsion is 58.07% without 
punishment, and 57.13% with punishment, including the cost for voting and punishment. Our findings 
indicate that the threat of expulsion as a sanctioning mechanism may not be helpful for public good 
provision unless expulsion can occur in every period, the threat of costly punishment increases 
contributions with little impact on efficiency, and that standards for inclusion rise when later punishment 
is available. 
JEL classification: H410; C920; D700; D720; 
Keywords: Public Good; Laboratory Group Behavior; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; Voting 
Behavior  
* Corresponding author: 589 McNair Road, Department of Economics, Annapolis, MD 21402, phone (410) 293-
6888, fax (410) 293-6899, email: pschmitt@usna.edu 
We would like to thank the United States Naval Academy department of Economics for financial support, 
and participants at the 2010 SEA meetings for helpful comments and suggestions.  All remaining errors 






1.  Introduction 
Social dilemmas arise when the incentives faced by individual group members lead to outcomes 
that are suboptimal from the perspective of the group.  Economic environments involving voluntary 
contributions to a public good have the incentive properties of a social dilemma.  Laboratory public good 
experiments have demonstrated that individuals may cooperate significantly more than predicted by 
game-theoretic, Nash Equilibrium predictions, but rarely reach and sustain Pareto optimal outcomes (see 
Ledyard (1995)).  
Previous experimental research on contributions to public goods has demonstrated the importance 
of fairness (Andreoni (1995)), reciprocity/conditional cooperating, (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 
(2001)), learning (Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman (1999)), or a combination of the three (Cooper, 
Kraker, and Stockman (2002), Harbaugh and Krause (2000)). The establishment of group identity (Eckel 
and Grossman (2005), Solow and Kirkwood (2002), and Keser and van Winden (2000)), and creating 
social norms (Rege and Telle (2004) and Tyran and Feld (2002)) have also been examined. The roles of 
repeated interactions, group size, and communication (with and without punishment) for cooperation have 
also been studied (Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006), Galbiati and Vertova (2008), Isaac, 
Walker, and Williams (1994), and Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992), Isaac and Walker (1988)).  
The literature has shown that the ability of groups to establish rules for individual behavior and 
sanction offenders is often a critical element in improving efficiency in such situations (Ertan, Page, and 
Putterman (2009), Ones and Putterman (2007), Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2006), Gurerk , Irlenbusch, 
and Rockenbach (2006), Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2005), Page, Putterman, and Unel (2005), 
Egas and Riedl (2005), and Fehr and Gächter (2000)), even though sanctioning is likely to be neither 
automatic nor costless to the enforcer.  Finally, the ability to form groups impacts efficiency. In particular, 
Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2008) find that restricting entry decreases efficiency because the cost of smaller 
groups mitigates the impact of increased contributions, while Ahn, Isaac, and Salmon (2009) find that 3 
 
restricting entry increases efficiency only if the public good is congestible. Similarly, Page, Putterman, 
and Unel (2005) find that endogeneous group formation increases efficiency.  
This paper extends the work of Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2005) who find that the 
threat of expulsion in every period raises contributions to near Pareto Optimal levels (except for the last 
period, contributions in the expulsion treatments averaged over 90% in almost all periods, with average 
contributions reaching as high as 98%). In their design, and therefore in ours, it is not rational to vote a 
member out if subjects are payoff maximizers because it lowers the total endowment available to the 
group. This sanction results in costs to the enforcer through both a direct voting cost and forgone future 
contributions. The sanction occurs if a majority of those in the group “vote” the subject permanently out 
of the group. The cost to the subject voted out is a smaller endowment (5 versus 10) and exclusion from 
payouts from the larger group’s public good. Maier-Rigaud, Martinsson, and Staffiero (2010) implement 
a similar experiment to examine the role ostracism has on contributions to a public good. They also find 
that contribution levels increase when group members are able to vote to ostracize group members in each 
period. 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), Maier-Rigaud et al. (2010), Page et al. (2005), and Ahn et al (2009) 
discuss the institutional framework for which this type of expulsion or regrouping is relevant. While local 
public goods and reformation of teams after a project is complete are relevant, frequent expulsion 
decisions are not. Ahn et al (2009) discusses examples of limited expulsion including a town or city de-
annexing, evicting apartment co-op members, and the firing of tenured faculty at a university. While they 
analyze the role of restricted entry, we focus on the role of limited expulsion in mitigating free-riding. 
Our primary contribution to the literature is an examination of the effect one-time threats of 
expulsion and punishment have on contributions to a public good. To this end, our design differs from 
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) in that subjects were allowed to vote to remove other subjects only between 
rounds 5 and 6 (the “expulsion only” treatment), and in one treatment subjects also voted whether to 
punish the remaining individuals between rounds 10 and 11 (the “with punishment” treatment). The data 4 
 
show that the additional threat of punishment not only increased the contributions of participants before 
the punishment vote, but also resulted in the expulsion of participants who had contributed more than in 
the expulsion only treatment. While lower than the nearly full efficiency levels found by Cinyabuguma et 
al. (2005) when the threat of expulsion was available in every period, we find efficiency with expulsion is 
approximately the same in the periods without punishment (58.07%) as with punishment (57.13%) when 
including the cost for voting and punishment. (Both are much higher than in their treatment with no 
expulsion in any period). Thus, while adding the ability to punish to a threat of expulsion changes 
contribution and voting behavior, it has little impact on efficiency. Finally, we find that the level of 
contributions necessary to avoid expulsion is higher when later punishment is available.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experiment and subjects. Section 3 
presents results followed by discussion and concluding remarks in Section 4. 
2.  The Experiment 
 
  In a public goods experiment, subjects receive an endowment each period which they can 
distribute between a private account and a group account. Money placed in the private account provides 
earnings for the subject only. Money placed in the group account provides earnings for all subjects in the 
group, but the amount earned by the individual is less than they could earn in the private account.
1 While 
the Pareto Optimal outcome is for all subjects to place all their money in the group account, the Nash 
Equilibrium is for all subjects to place all their money in the private account. As with any public good, 
participants have an incentive to free-ride. 
                                                            
1 This rate varies throughout the literature, but we use a marginal per capita return (MPCR) of $0.20 for all 16 
members of the group, therefore creating an efficiency factor of $3.20 if all members remain in the group. As noted 
by Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), choosing a MPCR = 0.20 yielded similar results to Isaac and Walker’s (1988) 10 
player design with a MCPR = 0.30.  5 
 
As in Cinyabuguma et al. (2005), our subjects played a repeated public good game in which they 
started in the Green Group (receiving an endowment of E$10
2 each period) and could be voted out and 
placed in the Blue Group (receiving an endowment of E$5 each period). The Green Group was initially 
composed of 16 subjects who receive an endowment of $10 experimental dollars (hereafter, E$10) for 
each of 15 periods. In a given period, a subject i’s earnings in experimental dollars is given by:  
(10 – Ci) + (0.2)*∑ Cj        ( 1 )  
where Ci is the amount that i contributed to the group account, and ∑ Cj is the sum of contributions to the 
group account by all members, i included. Subjects are informed of their total earnings after every round.   
This paper extends Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) by only allowing voting to expel once (between 
periods 5 and 6), and allowing an additional punishment for those not voted out of the Green group 
(between periods 10 and 11). These design changes allow us to examine if the threat needs to be available 
every period to achieve the Pareto Optimal outcome, or if it can be sustained once it is achieved through 
the threat of exclusion or punishment. Subjects received complete information regarding the treatment. 
That is, before subjects made any decision, they were instructed that they would be able to vote to expel 
members of the group (or could be expelled) after period 5 and, in the punishment treatment, they were 
instructed that they would be able to punish remaining members of the group (or could be punished) after 
period 10. 
After round five, subjects receive information on the others’ allocations
3 to the group account. 
This information includes the amounts each participant allocated to the group account, their earnings, and 
the average amount each allocated to the group account in each of the first 5 rounds. Next to the 
information for each subject is a box that can be checked to remove the individual in question from the 
Green Group. If a majority of members from the Green Group (eight or more) vote to expel a group 
                                                            
2 Experimental dollars were worth $0.05 each, paid in cash at the end of the session. Earnings ranged from $8.13 to 
$18.7, averaging about $13.82 for a 60-minute session. 
3 All members of the group are identified by letters in order to maintain confidentiality. 6 
 
member, that individual is moved to the Blue Group for the remaining 10 rounds. In each subsequent 
round, Blue Group members face the same allocation decision as those in the Green Group, but have E$5 
to allocate rather than E$10.  That is, those in the Blue Group face the same MPCR as those in the Green 
Group, but have the disadvantage of having a lower endowment and fewer group members.  
   When a subject is moved to the Blue Group from the Green Group, each member that voted to 
remove that subject is charged E$0.25. This charge only occurs if the group member under consideration 
is actually removed from the Green Group. After the voting is complete, all group members see the 
results of the voting on their respective screens. Since members view the number of votes cast against 
them, the number of votes signals social norms which could impact subjects in the punishment design. 
Subjects were advised that voting a member out lowers earnings potential to both the Green group and the 
Blue group for each remaining period. 
In addition to the expulsion only treatment, we examine a one-time expulsion, one-time 
punishment treatment. This experiment replicates the treatment discussed above but also includes a 
punishment vote after round 10. Subjects still in the Green Group after round 10 get information on 
others’ allocations to the group account. Similar to the voting process after round 5, Green Group 
members have the opportunity to vote to punish other members of their group. Paralleling the expulsion 
vote, if  half or more of the current members of the Green Group vote to punish a particular person, that 
person is charged E$40.
4 As in the expulsion vote, those successfully voting to punish a group member 
are each charged E$0.25. Regardless of punishment, subjects remain in the Green Group and could only 
be expelled after period 5. We did not conduct baseline games or replicate Cinyabuguma et al’s expulsion 
treatments; we ran two different treatments and compare our results to theirs. 
Data was collected over a one-month period in 2009 using college students primarily recruited 
from Principles of Economics classes (part of the General Education program) and through posted 
                                                            
4 This amount is equal to the benefit a participant would receive from shifting E$10 from the group account to their 
personal account for five rounds. 7 
 
campus announcements at Grand Valley State University. Each session ran about sixty minutes, with 
sixteen participants in each for a total of 96 subjects. Three sessions of each treatment were conducted 
and each subject participated no more than once. Experiments were conducted using Z-tree (Fischbacher 
(2007)). 
3.  Results 
Average participant contributions, earnings, and efficiency are summarized in Table 1 with 
details of the contributions given in Figure 1. In their no-expulsion baseline treatment, Cinyabuguma et 
al. (2005) found that average contributions were about 67% of endowment, dropping to 31% by period 3 
and to 8% in the last period.  In our expulsion only treatment, subjects that would remain in the Green 
Group contributed an average of 75% of endowment in period 1 and 67% of endowment in the five 
periods before the expulsion vote. Those who would be voted into the Blue Group contributed an average 
of 19% of endowment before the expulsion vote. In the five rounds that followed the expulsion vote the 
members of the Green Group contributed an average of 54% of endowment, which fell to 33% of 
endowment in rounds 11-15. Average contribution for the Green Group was 25% of endowment in round 
15. In contrast, when Cinyabuguma et al. introduced expulsion in every period, average contributions 
were at least 83% in the first round and then rose and stayed over 90% until round 14 or 15, where it 
dropped to between 8% and 33%. Thus, while one-time expulsion without punishment generated higher 
average contributions than no voting and lower average contributions than voting every round (as 
expected), contributions remained substantially above their baseline even after the one-time vote. 
When comparing voting behavior, Cinyabuguma et al.’s subjects expelled between 1 and 4 
participants in most sessions, while we had on average 2 expelled in the expulsion only treatment (who 
contributed an average of 19% of endowment) and 3.5 expelled in the punishment treatment (who 
contributed an average of 38% of endowment). Figure 2 shows the number of votes to expel a participant 
in our treatments by the contribution level prior to the vote. The graph shows a clear distinction between 8 
 
treatments both in the level of contributions and the contribution levels sufficient to be expelled. As in 
Cinyabuguma et al., the number of votes to expel decreased with higher contributions. Further, within 
each session, every participant expelled had contributed less than every participant not expelled.
5 
In our treatment with punishment, subjects that remained in the Green Group started with an 
average contribution of 81% of endowment and increased to 85% of endowment over the five periods 
before the expulsion vote (compared to 75% and 67% in the expulsion only treatment). Those who would 
be voted into the Blue Group contributed an average of 38% of endowment before the expulsion vote 
compared to 19% in the expulsion only treatment. In the five rounds following the expulsion vote and 
before the punishment vote, the average contribution for those in the Green Group fell from 85% to 78% 
of endowment (in the expulsion only treatment contributions started lower and fell further, from 67% to 
54% of endowment). In the post-punishment phase the average contribution in the Green Group fell to 
26% of endowment, lower than the average contributions of 33% of endowment in the expulsion only 
treatment. The average Green contribution in the punishment treatment was 12% of endowment in round 
15, also lower than in the expulsion only treatment (26% of endowment). 
Among the subjects that were not voted out of the Green Group in the punishment treatment, 
eight (21.6%) were punished. Those that were not punished contributed an average of 84% of endowment 
during periods 6-10, while those that were punished contributed an average of 54% of endowment. Figure 
2 shows the number of votes to punish a participant in our treatments by the contribution level between 
the votes to expel and punish. After the punishment phase those that were not punished contributed an 
average of 27% of endowment, while those that were punished contributed an average of 24% of 
endowment. Thus, those who were punished did not retaliate by substantially lowering contributions 
relative to those who were not punished. 
                                                            
5 In the expulsion-only treatment, 115 votes were cast, of which 85 were against players who had contributed less 
than the voter. In the treatment with expulsion and punishment 158 votes were cast to expel, of which 122 votes 
were cast against players who had contributed less than the voter. 9 
 
A final way to compare our two treatments is by the overall level of earnings, also provided in 
Table 1. In the phase before the expulsion vote the average level of earning across all participants was 
higher in the punishment treatment than in the expulsion only treatment. While the level of contribution 
was much higher in the punishment treatment, the average earning was lower in the second phase due to 
the costs of punishment. Despite the high cost of punishment, the average earning was still higher in the 
punishment phase through period 10. Thus, the peculiar nature of the contributions in the final phase 
(periods 11-15) has a significant contribution. That is, it changes the overall average per-round earning in 
the two treatments is approximately equal (E$18.58 versus E$18.28) which yields approximately the 
same level of efficiency across the treatments (58.07% without punishment and 57.13% with punishment, 
including the cost for voting and punishment). As can be seen in Table 1, players in the Green Group also 
had similar efficiency levels across the treatment (61.03% without punishment and 61.64% with 
punishment, including the cost for voting and punishment). 
While not a primary hypothesis of this paper, we note that in the punishment treatment Greens 
who would be punished averaged a cumulative payoff of E$234.81 in the round before punishment 
compared to E$210.11 for those who would not be punished. When comparing final cumulative payoffs, 
those who were punished averaged E$217.36 while those who were not punished averaged E$230.23. For 
comparison, the players in the expulsion-only treatment averaged E$193.15 and E$292.94, respectively. 
4.  Conclusions 
Following the design of Cinyabuguma, et al. (2005) (and similar to that of Maier-Rigaud et al., 
(2010)), we implement a public goods experiment where participants had either a one-time vote to expel 
other group members or a one-time vote to expel along with a one-time vote to punish remaining Green 
Group members. We do this to mimic an environment in which opportunities to expel or penalize a free-
riding group member are infrequent. 10 
 
Our first significant result is that a one-time threat of expulsion as a sanctioning mechanism 
reduces free-riding relative to no expulsion, but may not be helpful for public good provision unless 
expulsion can occur in every period. The data confirm that participants contribute more in the one-time 
expulsion vote treatment than in Cinyabuguma, et al.’s baseline of no expulsion. Adding a punishment 
vote further increases contributions, but not to as high a level as if there was a vote to expel participants 
every round. More interesting is the result that the average contribution in the treatment with a 
punishment vote drops below that in the expulsion only vote treatment. Further, the average contributions 
by those punished and those not punished were the same in the last five rounds of play. 
Our second significant result is that the threat of costly punishment increases contributions with 
little impact on efficiency. This occurs though two channels. First, the presence of a punishment vote 
increases average contributions, but also increases the standard by which participants were judged when 
voting to expel from the Green Group. This resulted in more participants being voted into the Blue Group 
including more moderately-contributing participants being expelled. Second, the costly punishment was 
used with sufficient frequency to negate the social gains from the higher contribution levels such that the 
overall average earning is the same between the treatments. 
It is also interesting to note that, in this design, potential free-riders (possible expellees) may find 
that they can exploit the group’s incentive to keep the group large. That is, expelling anyone with positive 
historical contributions may make the group worse off since that person is not replaced. Further research 
is needed to determine whether behavior changes relative to our design if members of the group know 
other players are available join the group if a current group member is expelled.11 
 





6 All subjects were in the Green Group in rounds one through five. Exclusion status compares those who would 
eventually be voted into the Blue Group to those who would not be voted out of the Green Group. Average earning 
indicates the average earnings in E$ for each participant per round (both Blue and Green), and the efficiency 
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Figure 1: Mean Contribution by Period and Exclusion Status
7 



























































































































































































































7 All subjects were in the Green Group in rounds one through five. The solid line displays the average contribution 
of subjects who remained in the Green Group for all rounds. The line composed of long dashes displays the average 
contribution of subjects who would eventually be voted into the Blue Group. The line composed of short dashes 
shows the contribution for all sixteen subjects for rounds one through five. 13 
 
 
Figure 2: Votes to Expel or Punish, by Contribution Level and Treatment (Sessions Pooled) 











































0 10 20 30 40 50





























0 10 20 30 40 50
















































0 10 20 30 40 50








Ahn, T.K., Isaac, R. M., and Salmon, T.C., 2008. Endogenous Group Formation. Journal of Public 
Economic Theory 10(2), 171 –194. 
 
Ahn, T.K., Isaac, R. M., and Salmon, T.C., 2009. Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group 
Sizes for Excludable Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics 93, 336 – 351. 
 
Andreoni, J., 1995. Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion? The American 
Economic Review 85 (4), 891 – 904. 
 
Cooper, D. J., Kraker Stockman, C., 2002. Fairness and Learning: An Experimental Examination. Games 
and Economic Behavior 41, 26 – 45. 
 
Cinybuguma, Matthias, Talbot Page, Louis Putterman. 2005, Cooperation under the Threat of Expulsion 
in a Public Goods Experiment. Journal of Public Economics 89, 1421-1435. 
 
Egas Martijn, Arno Riedl. 2005, The Economics of Altruistic Punishment and the Demise of Cooperation. 
Discussion Paper Series No. 1646. 
 
Eckel, C., Grossman, P., 2005. Managing Diversity by Creating Team Identity. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 58, 371 – 392. 
 
Ertan, A., Page, T., and Putterman, L. 2009. Who to Punish? Individual Decisions and Majority Rule in 
Mitigating the Free Rider Problem. European Economic Review 53, 495 – 511. 
 
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., 2000. Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. The American 
Economic Review 90 (4), 980 – 994.  
 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E., 2001. Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a 
Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71, 397 – 404. 
 
Fischbacher, U. z-Tree - Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments. Experimental 
Economics 10 (2): 171-178 (2007). 
 
Galbiati, R., Vertova, P., 2008. Obligations and Cooperative Behaviour in Public Good Games. Games 
and Economic Behavior 64(1), 146 – 170. 
 
Gurerk, O., Irelenbusch, B., Rockenbach, B., 2006. The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning 
Institutions. Science 312: 108 – 111. 
 
Harbaugh, W., Krause, K., 2000. Children’s Altruism in Public Good and Dictator Experiments. 
Economic Inquiry 38 (1), 95 – 109. 15 
 
 
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J., Williams, A., 1994. Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Provision of 
Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups. Journal of Public Economics 54, 1 – 36. 
 
Isaac, R. M., Walker J., 1988. Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution 
Mechanism. Economic Inquiry 585 – 608. 
 
Keser, C., van Winden, F., 2000. Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102 (1), 23 – 39. 
 
Ledyard, J.O., 1995. Public Goods. A Survey of Experimental Research. In J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth, 
Handbook of Experimental Economics (pp. 111-194). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Maier-Rigaud, F.P., Martinsson, P., Staffiero, G., 2010. Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good: 
Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 73, 387 – 395. 
 
Ones U., and Putterman, L. 2007. The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions 
Experiment with Controlled Group Formation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62, 495 – 
521. 
 
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Gardner, R., 1992. Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-governance is 
Possible. American Political Science Review 86, 404 – 417. 
 
Page, T., Putterman, L., Unel, B., 2005. Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: 
Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency. The Economic Journal 115, 1032 – 1053. 
 
Rege, M., Telle, K., 2004. The Impact of Social Approval and Framing on Cooperation in Public Good 
Situations. Journal of Public Economics 88, 1625 – 1644. 
 
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., Walker, J., 2006. The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public 
Goods. CAEPR Working Paper #2006-005. http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2006/CAEPR2006-
005.pdf 
 
Solow, J.L., Kirkwood, N., 2002. Group Identity and Gender in Public Goods Experiments. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 48, 403 – 412. 
 
Sonnemans, J., Schram, A., Offerman, T., 1999. Strategic Behavior in Public Good Games: When 
Partners Drift Apart. Economics Letters 62, 35 – 41. 
 
Tyran, J.R., Feld, L.P., 2002. Why People Obey the Rule: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of 
Public Goods, CESifo Working Papers No. 651(2), 1 – 33. http://www.cesifo-
group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo_wp651.PDF 